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Abstract
The scapegoat theory of exchange rates (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2004, 2013) suggests
that market participants may attach excessive weight to individual economic fundamentals,
which are picked as “scapegoats” to rationalize observed currency fluctuations at times when
exchange rates are driven by unobservable shocks. Using novel survey data that directly
measure foreign exchange scapegoats for 12 exchange rates, we find empirical evidence that
supports the scapegoat theory. The resulting models explain a large fraction of the variation
and directional changes in exchange rates in sample, although their out-of-sample forecasting
performance is mixed.
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1 Introduction1
A central conjecture of the work by Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b, 1988) is that the presence of time-varying2
parameters may be a key explanation for the failure of exchange rate models to predict future currency3
movements. Furthermore, time-varying parameters may not only help explain the weak out-of-sample4
predictive power of exchange rate models, but also the ex-post instability in the relationship between5
exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals, as pointed out by a growing literature. For example,6
Sarno and Valente (2009) show empirically that the relevance of information contained in fundamentals7
changes frequently over time, while in a survey of US foreign exchange (FX) traders Cheung and Chinn8
(2001) document that the importance attached by traders to different fundamentals changes over time.9
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (BvW, 2004, 2013) propose a scapegoat theory to explain the weakness10
of and instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals. The scapegoat theory11
suggests that this instability is not explained by frequent and large changes in structural parameters, but12
rather by expectations about these structural parameters.1 The scapegoat theory starts from the premise13
that, even though agents may have a fairly accurate idea about the relationship between fundamentals14
and exchange rates in the long run, there is substantial uncertainty about the structural parameters15
over the short to medium term. This implies that when currency movements over the short to medium16
term are inconsistent with their priors about the underlying structural relationships, agents search for17
scapegoats to account for these inconsistencies. Such currency movements may be driven by unobservable18
fundamentals, yet for agents it is rational to assign additional weight to some observable fundamentals,19
thus making them scapegoats for exchange rate changes.20
In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence – as illustrated in the quote below – that financial market21
participants blame individual fundamentals for exchange rate movements, with such blame often shifting22
across different fundamentals over time:23
“The FX market sometimes seems like a serial monogamist. It concentrates on one issue at a time, but24
the issue is replaced frequently. Dollar weakness and US policy have captured its heart. But uncertainties25
are being resolved ... The market may move back to an earlier love ...” [Financial Times, November 8,26
2010]27
The scapegoat theory entails that a particular macroeconomic variable is more likely to become a28
scapegoat the larger the (unexplained) FX rate movement and the more this particular fundamental is29
out of line with its long-run equilibrium. Over the short run, both the scapegoat fundamental as well as30
the unobservable fundamental may thus help explain FX movements. BvW (2009, 2013) also calibrate31
their model for five currencies of industrialized countries, using monetary fundamentals, to investigate32
its ability to match the moments of macro variables and exchange rates.33
The present paper constitutes - to our knowledge - the first empirical test of the scapegoat theory34
of exchange rates. An important difficulty in designing an empirical test in this context involves finding35
a suitable proxy for the weight assigned to individual economic fundamentals by market participants36
(needed to identify scapegoats), and a proxy for the unobservable fundamental. This is made possible37
by exploiting novel data on FX scapegoats from surveys of a broad set of investors, as well as FX order38
flow to proxy unobservable exchange rate determinants.239
Exchange rate scapegoats stem from monthly surveys of 40-60 financial market participants, who are40
asked to rate on a quantitative scale the importance of six key variables (short-term interest rates, long-41
term interest rates, growth, inflation, current account, and equity flows) as drivers of a country’s exchange42
rate vis-a-vis its reference currency.3 This survey data allows us to extract quantitative scapegoat43
measures for each of these six fundamentals over time and across currencies. It is also worth noting that44
real-time data, taken from the OECD, is used for all these time series. Further, FX order flow data45
proxies for unobservable factors driving exchange rates since order flow contains information that is not46
public given the over-the-counter institutional features of the FX market and is empirically powerful47
in explaining exchange rate movements, as documented in a vast literature on FX microstructure (e.g.48
Evans, 2010). The order flow series are constructed from high-frequency data obtained from the Reuters49
electronic trading platform D2000-2 on special order.4 The empirical estimations are conducted for 1250
1In fact, Bacchetta, van Wincoop and Beutler (2010) show that allowing for time-varying structural parameters has
only a small effect on the predictive power of fundamentals for exchange rates.
2This paper may thus be seen as a companion paper to the theory of BvW (2009, 2013) and their calibration exercises
in that we test empirically, rather than calibrate, the scapegoat model by using data on FX scapegoats.
3Specifically, with the exception of the current account all variables are measured as differentials relative to the country
of the reference currency. The reference currency is mostly the US dollar.
4Reuters is one of the two major FX dealing platforms and Evans and Lyons (2002) were the first to use Reuters order
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exchange rates over the period 2000-2011, using data at monthly frequency.51
The test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates rests on two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis52
inherent in the theory is that the inclusion of scapegoats (surveys) improves the power of fundamentals53
to explain exchange rate movements. We test this hypothesis by examining two specifications of the54
scapegoat model: one based on constant parameters following BvW (2013), and (a more general) one55
based on time-varying parameters as in the earlier version of BvW (2009). Although the unobservable56
fundamental is essential for the presence of scapegoat effects, simplified versions of the scapegoat models57
without our proxy are also estimated in order to evaluate the marginal contribution of the scapegoats58
versus the unobservable fundamental (order flow). Specifically, the following four models with constant59
parameters are estimated: a model that conditions only on macroeconomic variables (CP-M), which is60
tested against a model that conditions on scapegoats in addition to the same macroeconomic variables61
(CP-MS); a model that conditions on both macroeconomic variables and order flow (CP-MO), which62
is tested against a model that conditions on the scapegoats in addition to the same macro and order63
flow information (CP-SCA). The same four specifications, termed TVP-M, TVP-MS, TVP-MO and64
TVP-SCA, are then estimated allowing for time-varying parameters with Bayesian updating. Finally,65
the models are evaluated on several criteria – based on the adjusted R2, root mean squared errors,66
information criteria, and market-timing (directional accuracy) tests.67
Starting from the scapegoat models with constant parameters, the empirical analysis provides strong68
empirical evidence that these models generally outperform their respective benchmark models, i.e. the69
scapegoats add explanatory power to macroeconomic and order flow information. There is even stronger70
evidence supporting scapegoat effects when looking at the more general scapegoat model with time-71
varying parameters (TVP-SCA), which performs better than all alternative models across all performance72
criteria. Moreover, the magnitude of the improvement in the performance of TVP-SCA over the other73
models is substantial, leading to – on average across currencies – a hit ratio of correctly explained74
directional FX changes of about 75 percent and an adjusted R2 of about 36 percent.75
To shed light on the relative contribution of scapegoat effects and order flow, it is useful to note that76
the adjusted R2 for the scapegoat exchange rate model that does not include order flow can be as high77
as 30 percent. This suggests that the use of scapegoat variables per se can be sufficient to capture a78
substantial fraction of the unstable relationship between fundamentals and exchange rates, especially for79
models with time-varying parameters. Thus, the improvement in explanatory power of the scapegoat80
model does not only stem from the inclusion of the order flow variable, but also from the scapegoat81
parameters themselves.82
Although the focus of the paper is on testing the direct implications of the scapegoat theory of83
exchange rates, we also carry out an out-of-sample exchange rate forecasting exercise by using the same84
set of models and lagging the conditioning information to move from contemporaneous to one-month-85
ahead forecasting regressions. Moreover, at this point the driftless random walk benchmark is also86
added to the horse race since the random walk is the most common benchmark in the FX forecasting87
literature (see Rossi, 2013, and the references therein). The results suggest that the out-of-sample88
forecasts produced by the scapegoat models are not better than a random walk using some statistical89
criteria (e.g. root mean squared errors), but strongly beat the random walk in terms economic metrics90
of forecast evaluation (e.g. Sharpe ratios).91
The second hypothesis of the scapegoat theory relates to the determinants of the scapegoat factors92
themselves, and the question about which macroeconomic fundamental becomes a scapegoat, and at93
which point in time. The scapegoat theory states that a macro fundamental may become a scapegoat if94
there is a sizable shock to the unobservable fundamental, and at the same time the size of the deviation95
of the macro fundamental from its equilibrium is large and theoretically consistent with the observed96
direction of change in the exchange rate. Indeed this hypothesis is supported by our empirical analysis.97
Specifically, a macroeconomic fundamental is picked and identified by market participants as a scapegoat98
at times when (i) the unobservable fundamental experiences a large shock, (ii) the observable fundamental99
tends to show a large deviation from its long-term equilibrium, and (iii) moves in a direction that is100
consistent with the observed movement in the exchange rate.101
Finally, a key insight of BvW (2009) is that the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to the102
fundamentals is disconnected from the true underlying structural parameters in the short to medium103
term. In particular, this effect takes place when a macro fundamental receives an unusually large weight,104
flow data for FX analysis. Electronic brokers have become the preferred means of settling trades, and 50–70% of turnover
is settled through the two main electronic platforms, Reuters and Electronic Brokerage System (EBS). The relative size of
Reuters versus EBS varies across currencies, but Reuters generally dominates EBS for all currencies except the euro, the
Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc.
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and therefore is made the scapegoat for exchange rate changes. However, as a result of the investors’105
learning process, the expectation of the structural parameter should converge to the structural parameter106
in the long run. Our estimates support this prediction of the scapegoat theory: the expectation of the107
structural parameter converges toward the structural parameter as the scapegoat effect wears off.108
Overall, the empirical evidence provides strong support in favor of the scapegoat theory of exchange109
rates. The findings of the various tests are mutually consistent and suggest that the high degree of110
instability in the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals can be largely explained by the111
presence of scapegoats. In turn, this suggests that a more accurate understanding of exchange rates is112
achieved by taking into account the role of scapegoat factors, and their time-varying nature.113
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main elements of the scapegoat114
theory of exchange rates, and describes its testable empirical implications. Section 3 describes the data115
used for the empirical analysis. The empirical findings are then presented in Section 4, going through116
the two hypotheses outlined above. Section 5 concludes.117
2 Scapegoat theory and hypotheses118
The essence of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates is that at times some macroeconomic factors receive119
an unusually large weight and thus are made scapegoats of exchange rate movements. This scapegoat120
effect arises because of agents’ “rational confusion” as they make inference on the true parameters of121
the model only conditioning on observable fundamentals and exchange rate movements at times when122
the exchange rate is instead driven by unobservables (e.g. large order flows).5 Thus, when exchange123
rates move strongly in response to unobservables, it is rational for agents to blame factors that they can124
actually observe, and more precisely those macro fundamentals that are out of sync from their longer125
term equilibrium values and move consistently with observed exchange rates. This scapegoat effect can126
generate an unstable relationship between exchange rates and macro fundamentals, driven mainly by127
the expectation of the structural parameters and not by the structural parameters themselves. The next128
section describes such effects, and then introduces the main hypotheses for the empirical test of the129
scapegoat theory of exchange rates.130
2.1 The scapegoat model of exchange rates131
BvW describe the scapegoat effect in a series of papers (2004, 2009, 2013). These papers differ for132
several reasons, but they have the same central theme. Specifically, BvW (2004) assume that agents have133
heterogeneous information, whereas BvW (2009, 2013) develop a dynamic model where the exchange134
rate is forward looking and depends on expectations of future fundamentals. BvW (2009) examine the135
case where parameters are unknown and time-varying, whereas BvW (2013) show that the scapegoat136
effect can arise also with unknown and constant parameters. In practice, there are many ways in which137
parameter uncertainty can be generated. What is crucial to generate a scapegoat effect, however, is the138
uncertainty of the structural parameters attached to fundamentals, combined with the role of unobserved139
fundamentals: put simply, agents do not know the coefficients of the model and do not observe one of140
the fundamentals.141
It is useful to start by presenting the key equation describing the scapegoat effect when parameters142
are constant but unknown. Then, the more general case with time-varying parameters is described.143
Starting with a standard present-value equation for the exchange rate (e.g. Engel and West, 2005), BvW144
(2009, 2013) derive the following equation:145
146
∆st ∼= f ′t((1− λ)β + λEtβ) + (1− λ)bt, (1)
where st is the log nominal exchange rate (the foreign price of the domestic currency), ft = (f1,t, f2,t, . . . , fN,t)
′
147
is a vector of N observed macro fundamentals (in first differences), β = (β1, β2, . . . , βN )
′ is the vector148
of true structural parameters, Etβ is the vector of expected structural parameters, bt is the unobserved149
fundamental, and λ is the discount factor (0 < λ < 1).6 Thus, the true structural parameters β are150
constant but are unknown to investors, who learn over time about β through observing the exchange151
rate and the macro fundamentals. Precisely, each period t they observe the signal ftβ + bt. However,152
5In this paper the words agents and investors are used interchangeably.
6Note that, although BvW’s (2013) scapegoat model is presented for the exchange rate level, it also holds in first
differences (see BvW, 2009, eq. 8). This paper follows the specification in first differences given that exchange rates are
highly persistent variables and the focus is on modeling empirically their fluctuations rather than the exchange rate level.
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both the parameters β and the fundamental bt are unknown to them. As a result, although they can153
eventually learn about the structural parameters, this can only happen slowly over time.154
Equation (1) also shows that the fundamentals ft are multiplied by a weighted average of actual and155
expected parameters. However, since the discount factor λ is close to unity (see Engel and West, 2005;156
Sarno and Sojli, 2009), higher weights are attached to the expected values of the parameters rather than157
the actual values. Moreover, even though the parameters themselves are constant, the expectations of158
the parameters can change substantially over time. Precisely, the impact of macro fundamentals on the159
exchange rate in the scapegoat model can be formulated as:160
161
∂∆st
∂fn,t
∼= (1− λ)βn + λEtβn + λf ′t
∂Etβ
∂fn,t
. (2)
Interestingly, equation (2) shows that the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to the fundamentals162
not only depends on the expectation of the structural parameters, but also on the derivative of the163
expected structural parameters with respect to the fundamentals. The latter term reflects a transitory164
effect which can generate high-frequency fluctuations, which complement the short- to medium-term165
deviations generated by variations in the expectation of the structural parameters. As a result, the166
uncertainty about the parameters can determine transitory fluctuations in the exchange rate and induce167
instability in the model.168
BvW (2013) show that the scapegoat effect can exist even if the true structural parameters are169
constant. By contrast, when making the more realistic assumption that structural parameters vary over170
time, BvW (2009) derive the following equation for exchange rate changes:171
172
∆st = f
′
t((1− λ)βt + λEtβt) + (1− λ)bt + λ
T∑
i=1
f ′t−i (Etβt−i − Et−1βt−i) , (3)
where βt = (β1,t, β2,t, . . . , βN,t)
′ is the vector of time-varying true structural parameters, and Etβt =173
(Etβ1,t, Etβ2,t, . . . , EtβN,t)
′ is the vector of expected parameters at time t. The true structural param-174
eters βt now vary over time but are, again, unknown to investors. While investors may know the value175
of these structural parameters over the long run, they do not know their value and time variation in the176
short to medium term. For this reason, some observable macro fundamentals may at times be given an177
“excessive” weight by investors over the short term. This fundamental then becomes a natural scapegoat178
and influences the trading strategies of investors. As a result, in equation (3), changes in expectations179
of structural parameters directly determine changes in the exchange rate.180
It is now possible to state the empirical hypotheses to test this scapegoat theory. The first research181
hypothesis is that scapegoat effects are empirically powerful in explaining exchange rate movements.182
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate specifications of the scapegoat model of exchange rates183
both with constant and time-varying parameters, and evaluate them against benchmark models that184
do not allow for scapegoats. Our second main hypothesis relates to the determinants of the scapegoat185
parameters Etβt. The papers by BvW (2009, 2013) show that a particular macro fundamental is more186
likely to become a scapegoat when there are large shocks to the unobservable bt and this fundamental187
is out of sync with its longer term equilibrium value. The empirical test for this hypothesis is discussed188
below.189
2.2 Empirical scapegoat model with constant parameters190
The first scapegoat regression model with constant parameters is the empirical counterpart to equation191
(1) and is written as follows:192
193
CP − SCA : ∆st = f ′tβ + (τtft)′γ + δxt + ut, (4)
where τt is the vector of scapegoat parameters Etβ. The latter is identified by using survey data, and the194
theoretical unobserved fundamental bt is proxied by FX order flow xt; the measurement of both τt and xt195
is described in detail in Section 3. The scapegoat model requires γ to be non-zero and correctly signed,196
although for some variables the interpretation of the sign is not clear-cut (e.g. equity flows). Moreover,197
the parameters γ and β should be consistent with each other, and the order flow parameter δ should be198
negative, implying that buying pressure for the foreign currency is associated with a depreciation of the199
domestic currency (Evans and Lyons, 2002).200
The second model estimated is a simplified version of CP-SCA:201
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202
CP −MS : ∆st = f ′tβ + (τtft)′γ + ut, (5)
where the unobserved fundamental (xt) is now absent from the conditioning information set, and is203
therefore captured in the error term. This model specification is important as it allows us to gauge the204
relative contribution of the scapegoats versus the unobservable fundamental.205
An important issue is how to benchmark the scapegoat models to assess their explanatory power. The206
benchmark models are chosen so that in each comparison the only difference between the benchmark and207
the scapegoat model is that the latter allows for scapegoat effects. A natural candidate to benchmark208
CP-MS is a macro fundamental model with constant and known parameters, consistent with the present-209
value model of exchange rates (Mark, 1995; Engel and West, 2005; Engel, Mark and West, 2008). This210
model takes the form:211
212
CP −M : ∆st = f ′tβ + ut. (6)
However, when evaluating the explanatory ability of CP-SCA, which includes both the scapegoat213
variables and the unobserved fundamental (proxied by order flow), it is reasonable to ask how much of214
the additional explanatory power stems from the scapegoat variables and how much from order flow.215
Therefore, CP-SCA is evaluated against a benchmark model, termed CP-MO, which augments CP-M216
with order flow:217
218
CP −MO : ∆st = f ′tβ + δxt + ut. (7)
In sum, the test of the scapegoat model rests on the comparison of the empirical estimation of model219
(4) with the benchmark model (7), and of model (5) with the benchmark model (6), using several metrics220
of evaluation.221
2.3 Empirical scapegoat model with time-varying parameters222
The more general specification estimated is the empirical counterpart to equation (3):223
224
TV P − SCA : ∆st = f ′tβt + (τtft)′γ + δxt + ut, (8)
where the structural parameters are now time-varying, and τt denotes the vector of scapegoat param-225
eter Etβt.
7 A simplified version of equation (3) that excludes the unobservable fundamental from the226
conditioning information set is also considered:227
228
TV P −MS : ∆st = f ′tβt + (τtft)′γ + ut. (9)
Defining n as a generic macro variable, consider the case where each structural parameter βn,t evolves229
as a driftless random walk, βn,t = βn,t−1 + vn,t, which is common in the relevant literature (e.g. see230
Cogley and Sargent, 2002; Primiceri, 2005; Rossi, 2005; BvW, 2009). Assuming homoskedastic errors231
and uncorrelated factors, vt is a vector of normally distributed error terms with zero mean and diagonal232
covariance matrix Q. Both these assumptions can be relaxed, and are not crucial to our analysis.233
Appropriate benchmarks for our time-varying parameter scapegoat models also need to be models234
that account for parameter instability, which may be rationalized on a number of grounds (e.g. see235
Schinasi and Swamy, 1989; Rossi, 2005, 2006; Mark, 2009; Sarno and Valente, 2009). Following the236
same logic outlined in the previous section for constant parameter models, the following benchmark237
specifications are used to assess time-varying scapegoat models:238
239
TV P −M : ∆st = f ′tβt + ut (10)
TV P −MO : ∆st = f ′tβt + δxt + ut. (11)
Specifically, the analysis uses TVP-M as benchmark against TVP-MS, and TVP-MO as benchmark240
against TVP-SCA, so that in each comparison the difference between the benchmark and the scapegoat241
7Note that the last term in equation (3), which captures the change in the expectations of past parameters interacted
with past fundamentals, is missing from equation (8) as data on current and lagged expectations of past parameters are
hard to measure empirically. This means that the additional channel whereby current fundamentals lead to changes in the
expectation of both current and past parameters is neglected. Thus, if the hypothesis holds for the simplified model it
should hold more strongly if one were also to include the last term.
5
model is solely due to the scapegoat variables. Note that all the benchmark models in equations (6),242
(7), (10) and (11) assume that parameters are known to the investors and therefore are not scapegoat243
models. However, the benchmark models (10) and (11) also allow parameters to vary over time. From244
an econometric point of view our empirical scapegoat models require estimation of both time-varying245
parameters (βt) and time-invariant parameters (γ and δ). All empirical exchange rate models are esti-246
mated using Bayesian methods, following e.g. Kim and Nelson (1999) and Cogley and Sargent (2002,247
2005).8248
3 Data249
This section first describes the data used for the scapegoats and economic fundamentals, it then presents250
the order flow data, providing a discussion on why order flow can be interpreted as the unobservable251
fundamental.252
3.1 Scapegoats and fundamentals253
A novel dataset is used to measure when and which fundamentals are used as scapegoats for exchange254
rate movements by financial market participants. The aim is to extract a quantitative measure of the255
importance that investors attach to different macroeconomic fundamentals to explain exchange rates at256
a particular point in time.257
The data is based on the cross-sectional average, at every point in time, of surveys involving 40-60258
FX market participants from major financial institutions (mostly asset managers) conducted monthly by259
Consensus Economics. These market participants reside in many different locations globally, though the260
majority is located in the US, the UK and other advanced economies. The participants are asked to “rank261
the current importance of a range of different factors in determining exchange rate movements” for each262
of a broad set of currencies bilaterally vis-a-vis a reference currency, which mostly is the US dollar except263
for some European currencies for which the euro is the reference currency. More precisely, participants264
are asked to rank six macroeconomic factors on a scale from 0 (no influence) to 10 (very strong influence).265
The six variables are short- and long-term interest rates, growth, inflation, trade/current account, and266
equity flows. The survey explicitly stresses that the weights should be for the variables relative to those267
of the country of the reference currency.9268
Consensus Economics conducts the surveys every month, with the same financial market participants269
wherever possible. However, Consensus Economics conducts several surveys on exchange rates with270
these market participants (e.g. on short-term forecasts, longer-term forecasts, expected trading ranges,271
and market uncertainty), and alternates across these surveys throughout the year. This means that272
the surveys about FX scapegoats are conducted only between every 3 to 6 months, though at regular273
intervals over the years. The data for missing months are interpolated so as to arrive at a dataset with274
monthly observations. This is done by assigning the last available survey values to the months for which275
the survey is not conducted. In this way only information available to the investor at any point in time276
is used.10277
Overall, the survey data on FX scapegoats are available over a 12-year period (2000-2011) for a278
sample of 12 currencies, 6 being currencies of advanced countries (Australian dollar, Canadian dollar,279
euro, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, and UK pound) and 6 less industrialized and emerging market (EM)280
currencies (Czech koruna, Mexican peso, Polish zloty, South African rand, Singaporean dollar, and New281
Zealand dollar). Note that all exchange rates are defined with respect to the US dollar, except for the282
Swiss franc, the Czech koruna and the Polish zloty, which are defined with respect to the euro.283
Tables I and II in the Internet Appendix show summary statistics about the scapegoat surveys (raw284
and interpolated, respectively) for the 12 currencies in our sample. A first interesting fact is that the285
six macro variables have mostly similar means and standard deviations across all 12 currencies and286
over time. A somewhat higher mean is recorded for short-term interest rates, and a somewhat lower287
8The use of Bayesian methods in this context is particularly appropriate given our relatively small number of observations
and the persistence of the fundamentals, which are known to complicate statistical inference in exchange rate regressions.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are used to simulate draws from the posterior distribution, under diffuse
priors. The MCMC algorithm is described in detail in the Internet Appendix.
9Of course, the six macro fundamentals at our disposal only comprise a subset of the macro variables potentially relevant
for FX rates (see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2003). However, the variables in the survey are all standard in
the literature on exchange rate determination.
10The results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar when experimenting with a simple linear interpolation and a
Kalman filter smoother, and when using quarterly rather than monthly data.
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mean for inflation as scapegoat. Also, interest rates (especially short-term) and inflation have been the288
dominant scapegoats, in the sense that they have been more frequently considered by investors as the289
main scapegoats. Figure 1 also shows the time variation of the scapegoat factors for some advanced and290
EM currencies, which is useful to illustrate how the weights investors attach to macro fundamentals can291
change substantially over time, and the main scapegoat changes fairly frequently.292
The monthly scapegoat data are then matched with the real-time data on macroeconomic fundamen-293
tals for these six variables. To obtain monthly data, the trade balance is used instead of the current294
account, and industrial production is used as a measure of output to proxy GDP. The data source for295
the real-time macro series is the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators, where it is possible to track both296
data for original release (i.e. in real time) and final release for all the countries examined.11 Specifically,297
real time data are used for growth, inflation and trade balance. Then, interest rate and equity flow data298
are obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Note that, although equity flow data299
are not revised, they are published with a lag. To control for this, the final release equity flow data300
are lagged. Using data in real time implies that only information that was available historically at a301
particular point in time is used, allowing therefore both for measurement errors and release delays that302
affect macroeconomic data.12 To be as consistent as possible with the surveys, actual macroeconomic303
fundamentals are calculated relative to those of the country of the reference currency.304
A final point concerns the exchange rate data. Given the survey questions, it is preferable to use use305
nominal bilateral exchange rate changes vis-a-vis the reference currency, in the benchmark specification306
using changes over the past month. Exchange rates (expressed as the foreign price of the reference307
currency) are downloaded from Datastream.13308
3.2 Order flow309
The other important data for the empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates is on order310
flow, defined as the net of buyer- and seller-initiated FX transactions for the foreign currency. BvW’s311
papers stress the key role of unobservables, in particular unobservable trades, as drivers of exchange312
rates. FX order flow is used as a proxy for unobservable factors.313
Data on bilateral order flow is vis-a-vis the reference currency over the period from January 2000 to314
November 2011. The order flow data are created based on tick-by-tick data from the Reuters electronic315
trading platform D2000-2. To match the order flow data to the scapegoat data, the order flow is316
aggregated over the previous month. Table IV provides some summary statistics of the order flow series317
for each of the 12 currencies in our sample, indicating that order flow fluctuates considerably over time.14318
The FX market is an opaque market with little regulations, like e.g. disclosure requirements seen in319
other asset markets. Trading is organized in two main segments: (i) the customer-bank segment where320
end-user customers trade with banks, and (ii) the interdealer segment where banks trade with each321
other. Trades in the customer-bank segment are only observed by the two parties involved. Since dealers322
typically do not accumulate large inventory of currency, the trading in the interdealer market is then a323
derivative of the trading with customers. This interdealer order flow is not easily available to end-user324
customers like investors. Moreover, dealers typically only observe this order flow at very high frequency.325
Further analysis of this order flow requires both expensive subscriptions and calculations based on large326
amounts of data, since Reuters does not provide data on aggregate order flow. In practice this amounts327
to aggregate order flow being unobservable.15328
Evans and Lyons (2002) first documented that order flow explains a substantial proportion of the329
fluctuations in two major exchange rates. In their setting, order flow is derived from a customer portfolio330
shift independent of the current state of the economy, and as such closely resembles the unobservable331
11For Australia and New Zealand, however, only quarterly data are available for output and hence the data are interpo-
lated by using the latest value available until a new data point is released. Note also that real time data for Singapore are
not available. As a result, it is not possible to control for the data revisions. However, the final release data are lagged to
account for the delay at which macro data are released.
12Several researchers have used real-time data for exchange rate models (e.g. Sarno and Valente, 2009; Molodstova,
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell, 2011).
13Table III presents summary statistics for the macro fundamentals with all variables, except the current account, being
measured relative to the reference currency. Table IV presents exchange rate summary statistics.
14Specifically, daily data are constructed from tick data and include the most active part of the trading day between
7:00 and 17:00 GMT. In addition, weekends and holidays are excluded. Order flow is measured as the aggregated difference
between the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated transactions; positive (negative) order flow implies net purchases
(sales) of the foreign currency. The daily order flow data are then aggregated to the monthly frequency.
15In essence, utilization of this data first requires a special order and authorization to download tick data via a live feed.
Then it is necessary to aggregate the data from tick frequency to generate signed daily order flow data, from which data
at lower frequency can finally be derived.
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fundamental suggested in BvW (2004, 2006, 2009, 2013). Such a portfolio shift can in principle also be332
linked to shifts in preferences and risk premia.333
Subsequent papers have further investigated the possible drivers of order flow. Evans (2010) and334
Evans and Lyons (2013) study how order flow reflects and aggregates information at the micro level335
(e.g. from firms and households), hence capturing information on macroeconomic fundamentals not yet336
observable in real time. Consistent with such a view, Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010) find that order flow is337
linked to updates in expectations about the macroeconomy. Similarly, Dominguez and Panthaki (2006),338
Berger, Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka and Wright (2008), Love and Payne (2008) and Evans and Lyons339
(2008) have linked the information content of order flow to macroeconomic news.16 Finally, it seems340
reasonable that order flow also captures information about (shocks to) liquidity and risk-aversion which341
are not observable in real time; for example, one would expect that demand for riskier, high-interest342
rate currencies drops at times of lower market liquidity and higher risk-aversion. Indeed in Kyle’s (1985)343
model, which has inspired much of the subsequent theory in equity and FX microstructure, the impact344
of order flow on asset returns also depends on liquidity.345
A key point is, however, that irrespective of the source giving rise to order flow, this creates a change346
in exchange rates that is not immediately understandable for investors since order flow is not public347
information. This is the underlying assumption in all the cases above, regardless of the specific source348
of information that generates order flow.349
4 Empirical results350
This section describes the core empirical results. The focus is on the empirical model specifications351
outlined above, with the six macro fundamentals available in the scapegoat survey data: growth, inflation,352
short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, current account, and equity flows. All these variables,353
except the current account, are computed as differential with respect to the domestic variable.354
Before turning to the estimation results, it is important to explain how the observed fundamentals355
are chosen. Each regression includes only three macro fundamentals. The ideal would be to use all the356
six macro fundamentals, so that each of the six observable variables has a chance of being selected as357
the scapegoat by investors. However, the use of too many fundamentals would make the estimation358
unfeasible (in particular when the parameters are time-varying). Thus, the attention is restricted to359
only three fundamentals, which are allowed to be country specific, using the general-to-specific model360
selection procedure of Hendry and Krolzig (2005). Precisely, the general unrestricted model is specified361
as:362
363
∆st = γ1τ1,tf1,t + . . .+ γ6τ6,tf6,t + ut, (12)
whereby changes in the exchange rate (∆st) are related to the second term of equation (8). By applying364
this general-to-specific model selection in order to produce an operational model, regression (12) is365
implicitly used to pre-screen the scapegoats, reducing the number of potential scapegoats from six to366
three.17367
Table 1 summarizes the estimates of the model with constant parameters (CP-M in equation (6)).368
The table contains point estimates and one-standard deviation Bayesian confidence intervals (in squared369
brackets). Moreover, Table 1 also shows the set of variables selected by the general-to-specific method370
for each country. Inflation and short-term interest rate differentials are the most frequently selected371
scapegoats for industrialized countries, whereas growth is only chosen for the Japanese yen. By contrast,372
there is less dominance of any specific scapegoats for EM countries, where short- and long-term interest373
rates are each selected four times, inflation and growth three times, equity flows twice, and the current374
account once.375
16As Lyons (2001) describes very intuitively: “The observable relevant information is transmitted to exchange rates
without any trading having to take place, while the macroeconomic part of order flow [...] represents the part that is
unobservable and hence possible to trade upon.”
17General-to-specific modeling has relatively low search costs, and there is accumulating evidence on its satisfactory
performance (Campos, Ericsson, and Hendry, 2005). Hoover and Perez (1999) first showed that automated general-to-
specific model selection procedures display sufficiently high power to detect many of the models hidden in very general
unrestricted models. Hendry and Krolzig (2003) have then improved on the algorithm developed by Hoover and Perez
(1999) in what has become the econometrics software package of PcGets. The Hendry and Krolzig algorithm is used to
perform the general-to-specific procedure starting from the general unrestricted model (12) and excluding sequentially
the variable associated with the lowest p-value, calculated to allow for multiple search paths as described in Hendry and
Krolzig (2005). The procedure is repeated sequentially for each exchange rate until the three most significant variables are
identified.
8
We proceed column-by-column, thus interpreting the coefficient of each macro fundamental in turn.376
Growth has the expected negative (and statistically significant) coefficient for all four exchange rates377
where it is selected as a scapegoat, so that the currency of the faster growing country appreciates.378
In general, the foreign currency appreciates when inflation rises, with a couple of exceptions – the379
Polish zloty and the Mexican peso, although in the latter case the coefficient is tiny and statistically380
insignificant. The majority of the loadings on interest rate differentials are negative, implying that higher381
interest rates are generally associated with an appreciation of the currency. Moreover, a current account382
deficit is associated with a weaker currency in each case. Finally, with the only exception of the Canadian383
dollar, as equity inflows in the domestic country rise relative to the inflows in the foreign country, the384
domestic currency depreciates.18385
Table 2 presents the estimates of the coefficients (β, γ and δ) of the scapegoat model with constant386
parameters (CP-SCA in equation (4)). If the expectation of the structural parameters matters for the387
exchange rate due to scapegoat effects, γ must be statistically different from zero. Also, defining n as a388
generic macro variable, γn should intensify the effect of the true parameter βn so that it should take the389
same sign as the structural parameter. Overall, γ and β are strongly significant over both the country390
and variable dimensions (with only one exception), and that the γ coefficients intensify the effect of the β391
coefficients (i.e. they have the same sign). These results are consistent with the benchmark macro model392
with constant parameters. Another comforting finding is the existence of a close link between monthly393
exchange rate movements and order flow, so that net buying pressure for a currency is associated with its394
appreciation. This result confirms that unobservable fundamentals, proxied by order flow, exert a strong395
effect on exchange rates. This is a necessary condition for the scapegoat effect to exist, as outlined in396
Section 2.397
However, as also discussed in Section 2, the comparison between CP-SCA and CP-M does not make398
clear the relative contribution of the scapegoats and order flow. Therefore, two additional models are399
also estimated. Specifically, we estimate a simplified version of the scapegoat model that does not include400
order flow (CP-MS in equation (5)). This model is essentially the same as CP-M augmented with the401
surveys, hence helping us establish the importance of scapegoats in the absence of order flow information.402
Table V in the Internet Appendix presents results for CP-MS, showing no qualitative difference worth403
noting with respect to CP-SCA, regarding both the sign and significance of the coefficient estimates.404
Finally, to conclude the estimation of constant parameter models, a model that augments CP-M with405
order flow, namely CP-MO in equation (7), is also considered. Again, there are not major qualitative406
differences relative to CP-SCA in that order flow always enters the regression with the correct sign and407
is statistically significant (see Table VI in the Internet Appendix).408
Table 3 presents the estimates of γ and δ for the scapegoat model with time-varying parameters (TVP-409
SCA in equation (8)). For scapegoat effects to exist, also in this case γ and δ should be statistically410
different from zero. Consistently, the results show that the γ coefficients are generally significant over411
both the country and variable dimensions. The existence of a close link between exchange rate movements412
and order flow is also confirmed as δ is statistically significantly different from zero. Table VII in the413
Internet Appendix reports results for TVP-MS. Similar to the constant parameter case, there are no414
substantial differences with TVP-SCA. Thus, one can conclude that also for the time-varying parameter415
models there is evidence in support of the basic predictions of the scapegoat model in terms of statistical416
significance of γ and δ.19417
4.1 In-sample fit of scapegoat models418
The first hypothesis of the scapegoat theory, as formulated in Section 2, is that scapegoat effects are419
empirically powerful in explaining exchange rate movements. This requires that the scapegoat models420
(with constant and time-varying parameters) perform satisfactorily in fitting exchange rate fluctuations,421
and outperform the respective benchmark models, i.e. CP-MS and TVP-MS outperform CP-M and TVP-422
M respectively, and CP-SCA and TVP-SCA outperform CP-MO and TVP-MO respectively. These model423
comparisons should inform us about both the explanatory power of the scapegoat model for exchange424
rate changes and the relative importance of scapegoat information (surveys) versus order flow. In this425
sub-section, we present evidence on the statistical performance of the scapegoat models relative to the426
benchmark models, using several conventional criteria of model evaluation – the (adjusted) R2, root427
18This sign is consistent with the general equilibrium model of Hau and Rey (2006), and hence likely due to FX hedging
demand when investors’ portfolios become more exposed to FX risk.
19Estimations of TV P −M and TV P −MO are not reported, but their in-sample performance is evaluated alongside
the scapegoat models later in this section.
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mean square error, information criteria, and market timing tests. We first review the results for the case428
of constant parameter models, and we then turn to the more general case of time-varying parameters.429
Table 4 presents the results for the models with constant parameters. In general, the first result430
worth noting is that the explanatory power of the scapegoat model CP-SCA is much larger than that of431
any other model considered. For some currencies the order of improvement is remarkable: we move from432
explaining very little of the variation in exchange rate changes to explaining a much larger proportion (e.g.433
the CP-SCA adjusted R2s are close to, or above, 30% for 7 out of 12 exchange rates). Then, by comparing434
the scapegoat model, CP-SCA with CP-MO, which includes macro and order flow information but not435
the surveys, it is possible to isolate the marginal contribution of order flow to the goodness of fit of the436
model. The comparison of adjusted R2 between these two models reveals that CP-SCA always improves437
over CP-MO with the improvement ranging from 1-2% to about 8%, although CP-MO is typically the438
second best model in the horse race. Similarly, the comparison of CP-MS with CP-M, neither of which439
incorporates order flow information, reveals that the surveys add substantial explanatory power to a440
model that only conditions on macroeconomic information. In essence, the results suggest that the441
surveys (scapegoats) are powerful in explaining exchange rate fluctuations and allow us to improve over442
a macro model, and that it is important to include the unobserved fundamental (order flow) for the443
scapegoat model to substantially outperform the benchmark macro model.444
In addition to the adjusted R2, Table 4 reports the root mean squared error (RMSE), two information445
criteria – the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) – and446
two tests of market timing. In general, the RMSE and information criteria confirm the results of the R2,447
although there are isolated exceptions.448
With respect to market timing tests, Table 4 reports the ‘hit’ ratio (HR) – calculated as the proportion449
of times the sign of the fitted value correctly matches the one of the realized change in the exchange450
rate – and the Henriksson and Merton (HM, 1981) test.20 The hit ratios show that for most countries451
CP-SCA is the best performing exchange rate model, with CP-MO the second best model. For example,452
the HR is as high as 76% for the South African rand and the euro. Also, the performance of CP-453
MS is generally higher than CP-M. These findings, in terms of pecking order of the models, are largely454
corroborated by the results of the regression-based HM test. The ϕHM1 coefficient for the scapegoat model455
(CP-SCA) is the highest for most countries and generally strongly statistically significant. Overall, the456
stronger performance of the scapegoat model with constant parameters is fairly clear-cut for a number457
of currencies when looking at the adjusted R2, information criteria and market-timing tests. That said,458
it is also evident that the inclusion of the order flow variable is important to generate such superior459
performance, confirming the evidence reported in much empirical microstructure research.460
The results for the time-varying parameter models are reported in Table 5. The results corroborate461
(and strengthen) the earlier finding that the scapegoat model (now TVP-SCA) outperforms all other462
models. Moreover, the pecking order is generally respected, as TVP-SCA outperforms TVP-MO, which463
is superior to TVP-MS, which in turn outperforms TVP-M. The results are particularly clear-cut for464
the adjusted R2, the RMSE and the information criteria, whereas the market timing tests display some465
exceptions. In sum, a fairly clear result emerges: the scapegoat model generally yields the best perfor-466
mance, and both scapegoats and order flow information are important in driving this result, consistent467
with the scapegoat theory of BvW (2004, 2013).468
4.2 When does a fundamental become a scapegoat?469
The focus now turns to the second hypothesis of the scapegoat theory as formulated in Section 2.470
Specifically, the test investigates whether the scapegoat τn,t is related to the joint evolution of macro471
fundamentals and unobservable fundamentals. This is an important question as episodes of rational472
confusion can only arise, according to the theory, when there are large shocks to the unobservable473
fundamental. During these episodes it becomes rational for agents to blame factors they can actually474
observe and that fit the outcome. Furthermore, among those observable factors, investors will tend to475
blame those that are out of sync with their longer term equilibrium value. Fundamentals that can catch476
the investors’ attention by deviating from longer-term values, and are theoretically consistent with the477
change in the exchange rate, can create a scapegoat effect if the change due to unobservable factors is478
sufficiently surprising, i.e. large.479
20The HM test is asymptotically equivalent to a one-tailed test on the significance of the slope coefficient in the following
regression: I{
∆st>0
} = ϕHM0 +ϕHM1 I{∆˜st>0} + εt, where ∆st, ∆˜st denote the realized and fitted exchange rate returns,
respectively; and I{·} is the indicator function that takes the value of 1 when its argument is true and 0 otherwise. A
positive and significant ϕHM1 provides evidence of market timing.
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For instance, take output growth as example. Higher output growth should lead to an appreciation480
of the exchange rate. Now imagine that as a result of large order flow there is a sharp appreciation of481
the domestic currency. At the same time domestic output growth happens to be below its long-run level,482
or even negative. In this case, output growth clearly cannot explain the appreciation. There would have483
to be strong positive output growth to explain the appreciation. The theory implies that in this case484
output growth cannot be the scapegoat of the exchange rate.485
For this reason, it is first important to check whether on average large changes in a macro fundamental,486
at times when order flow also displays large shocks, are theoretically consistent with directional changes487
in the exchange rate. The test is based on the following panel regression of the exchange rate on order488
flow interacted with a macro factor:489
490
∆st = α0 + α1 (−xt × fn,t) I{fqn,t,xqt} + ut, (13)
where order flow is taken with the minus sign so that the expected sign of the parameter α1 should be the491
one expected from regressing the exchange rate on the fundamental.21 Order flow and the fundamental492
are selected for different quantiles; precisely our focus is on the top 20, 30 and 40 percent of observations.493
However, a particular observation is selected only if both the fundamental and order flow have experienced494
a sufficiently large shock, i.e. they fall in their respective quantiles. Thus, I{fqn,t,xqt} takes the value of495
1 if fn,t and xt are respectively in their top q percent of observations.
22 As mentioned above, this is496
a necessary condition for the fundamental to become a scapegoat. Moreover, to some extent, the sign497
of the regression is also important, as it informs us whether the movement of the exchange rate is on498
average theoretically consistent with the movement in order flow and the fundamental.23499
Table 6 provides some support to the scapegoat theory, as the signs of the statistically significant500
coefficients are theoretically consistent. Specifically, three of the scapegoats considered have statistically501
significant coefficients. For example, output growth and the current account have the expected negative502
sign so that positive output growth and a current account surplus are both associated with an appreciation503
of the exchange rate, when there is also strong net buying pressure for the currency. Output growth504
is statistically significant for particularly large values in the top 20 percent of observations, while the505
current account is especially strongly significant for the top 30 and 40 percent of observations. Moreover,506
the long-term interest rate differential enters with a negative coefficient, so that higher interest rates507
are associated with an appreciation of the currency, and is strongly statistically significant for all of the508
quantiles considered.509
So far only the first leg of our second hypothesis has been tested. The focus now turns to the510
second part of the test, where it emerges that the survey weight indeed rises (i.e. a variable becomes a511
scapegoat) when large changes to the fundamental are associated with a large shock to the unobservable.512
In particular, what follows relates the scapegoat weight of a macro variable to the absolute value of the513
interaction between the macro factor itself and order flow. For simplicity, the analysis assumes that only514
one macro factor is a scapegoat at any one point in time. Take again the example of output growth: only515
those observations for which market participants attach a high weight to output growth relative to the516
other macro fundamentals are selected. Therefore, the indicator function excludes those observations for517
which output growth is not selected as a scapegoat by the investor, i.e. when the value of the survey on518
output growth is relatively low. Thus, our empirical test is based on the panel regression:519
520
τn,t = ζ0 + ζ1
∣∣xt × fn,t∣∣ I{τn,t>τj,t}I{fqn,t,xqt} + εt, (14)
where the indicator function I{fqn,t,xqt}, consistent with Table 6, takes the value of 1 if at time t both fn,t521
and xt are in the top q percent of observations, whereas I{τn,t>τj,t} takes the value of 1 if the survey on522
the macro factor n exceeds the values of the remaining two macro factors j 6= n at each time t. Equation523
(14) closely follows the model of BvW (2009, 2013), where the expectation of the structural parameter524
at time t is determined by the weighted average of time t − 1 expectation of the structural parameter525
and the structural parameter itself, plus a term similar to our (xt × fn,t). In the theory, this last term526
21Assume that the fundamental has a positive average impact on the exchange rate. Order flow has a negative impact.
In this case negative order flow combined with a positive fundamental (or positive order flow with a negative fundamental)
should make the variable a scapegoat. So we simply regress the exchange rate on minus the product of order flow times
the fundamental. Therefore, the sign of the regression should be the same as expected from regressing the exchange rate
on the fundamental.
22These regressions are performed in panel (across all currencies for one macro variable at a time) to increase estimation
accuracy as the use of the quantiles, combined with the indicator function, substantially reduces the number of observations.
23That said, different theories may sometimes conflict over the sign to attach to a particular variable.
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reflects the scapegoat effect.24527
Table 7 presents the regression results. The parameter ζ1 takes the expected positive sign for all528
fundamentals and quantiles, and is strongly statistically significant for five of the macro variables con-529
sidered at all quantiles (the exception being the long-term interest rate). This result suggests that τn,t530
acts indeed as a scapegoat parameter as it consistently increases when both macro fundamentals and531
order flows become large in absolute value. Table 7 also shows that this statistical relation is strong for532
all fundamentals, with the R2 reaching 79 percent for the regression using equity flows.533
In sum, taken together, the two legs of the test give support to the scapegoat theory, indicating534
not only that scapegoat effects are powerful in enhancing the empirical performance of exchange rate535
models, but also that these effects arise when large unobservable shocks move the exchange rate and the536
scapegoat experiences a large value, consistent with the theory.537
While the above results are clear-cut, it is worth recalling that they depend on the validity of the538
assumption that order flow is a suitable proxy for the unobservable fundamental. As discussed earlier,539
the microstructure literature provides different interpretations of the information in order flow, which can540
reflect information both at the micro and macro level as well as variation in risk aversion and liquidity in541
financial markets. Irrespective of its underlying drivers, order flow generates a change in exchange rates542
that is not understandable for investors since order flow is not publicly observed, hence being a logical543
proxy for the unobserved fundamental in the scapegoat theory. However, future research is warranted to544
test the theory using alternative proxies for the unobserved fundamental or using latent factors.545
4.3 Learning in the long run546
A key insight of the BvW (2009) theory is that the derivative of the exchange rate with respect to the547
fundamentals – recall equation (2) – can be disconnected from the true underlying structural parameters548
in the short to medium term. In particular, this effect takes place when a macro fundamental receives549
an unusually large weight, and therefore is made the scapegoat for exchange rate changes. However, as550
a result of the investors’ learning process, the expectation of the structural parameter should converge551
to the structural parameter in the long run. This implies that the evolution of Etβn,t and the evolution552
of βn,t should be linked in the limit. Specifically, Etβn,t should tend to βn,t when the scapegoat effect553
wears off.554
This hypothesis can be analyzed by using our estimates from TVP-SCA. Specifically, this is done by555
estimating the following model:556
557
∆Êtβn,t = b0 + b1(
̂Et−1βn,t−1 − β̂n,t−1) + b2( ̂Et−1βn,t−1 − β̂n,t−1)I{∆τn,t<0} + εn,t. (15)
where n refers to a macro variable (e.g. growth); β̂n,t−1 is the estimated time-varying structural pa-558
rameter; Êtβn,t = γ̂nτn,t, where γ̂n is the estimated scapegoat parameter presented in Table 8 and τn,t559
is the survey; and I{∆τn,t<0} is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 for negative changes560
in the survey (∆τn,t < 0), and 0 otherwise. The scapegoat theory suggests that Etβn,t tends to βn,t561
only when the scapegoat effect wears off, i.e. investors attach less weight to the fundamental. Hence,562
one would expect that b1 + b2 < 0, so that the model is stable and Etβn,t corrects towards its long-run563
equilibrium, which is determined by βn,t. In contrast, no correction should take place otherwise, so that564
b1 ≥ 0. A positive value of b1 tells us that Etβn,t does not converge to βn,t or may even diverge from565
βn,t, consistent with a scapegoat effect taking place.566
Table 8 presents the estimation results. There is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that as the567
scapegoat effect wears off the expectation of the structural parameter converges towards the structural568
parameter. In fact, for all fundamentals b1 + b2 is negative and statistically significant, generally at the569
1 percent significance level. Of interest is also that b1 is positive, with the only exception of growth,570
indicating that when the survey increases, or is stable, no learning is taking place and the expectation571
of the structural parameter may diverge from the true parameter.572
4.4 Out-of-sample forecasting and the random walk573
Much empirical research has tested the usefulness of exchange rate theories by evaluating models in out-574
of-sample forecasting. Therefore, an out-of-sample forecasting exercise is carried out as an additional575
24The weighted average instead reflects the rather slow speed of learning, as agents attach higher weight to the past
expectation of the structural parameter than the structural parameter itself.
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and final piece of empirical evidence on the performance of the scapegoat model, although the theory is576
silent on the role of scapegoats for forecasting.577
Among the many lessons from the line of research on forecasting exchange rates, it is worth noting two:578
i) the driftless random walk model is a logical and hard benchmark to beat in out-of-sample forecasting;579
ii) the results are mixed in that forecasting ability varies depending on the macro variables used and580
the metric of evaluation adopted when comparing exchange rate models to the random walk (e.g. Rossi,581
2013). Therefore, the analysis below considers the driftless random walk as an additional model and582
uses it as benchmark for the tests of forecast accuracy, while relying on different metrics of evaluation –583
statistical and economic – to check the sensitivity of the results to the metric chosen.584
The forecasting setup is the following. All models are estimated using data up to December 2006,585
and then out-of-sample recursive forecasts are produced for the period from January 2007 to November586
2011.25 The variable selection is repeated each month, as described in Section 4. One-month-ahead587
forecasts are then generated based on the predictive specifications of the following models: the constant588
parameter macro model (CP-M), the survey model (CP-MS), the order flow augmented macro model589
(CP-MO), and the scapegoat model (CP-SCA).26 These models are assessed against the driftless random590
walk model (RW). Then, model comparison is based on the following statistics: the ratio of the root591
mean squared forecast error (RMSFER) from a model over that of the RW; the hit ratio (HR); the592
Henriksson-Merton test (HM); and measures of economic values that are summarized in the Sharpe593
ratio.27 The Sharpe ratio is simply the outcome of a trading strategy that goes long in the currency594
that the model predicts will appreciate, and short in the currency predicted to depreciate by the model,595
for each exchange rate considered. Hence, the Sharpe ratio provides a direct measure of the economic596
value of the scapegoat model, and can be compared and tested against the Sharpe ratio generated by597
the benchmark RW model to check whether any difference in economic value relative to the RW is598
statistically different from zero.599
The forecasting results are reported in Table VIII of the Internet Appendix for each exchange rate,600
while Table 9 provides a summary of the results by reporting average statistics across the 12 exchange601
rates considered. Starting from the ratio of the RMSFER of a model relative to the RW benchmark,602
one can see that such ratio is generally bigger than unity, meaning that the RW produces lower forecast603
errors.604
Turning to the hit ratios, it is apparent that the scapegoat model generally produces the most accurate605
forecasts in terms of directional accuracy, being above the 50 percent accuracy that would be implied by606
a random directional forecast. On average across exchange rates, the directional accuracy of CP-SCA607
is 54.82 percent (specifically, 54.09 and 55.56 percent for industrialized and EM countries, respectively).608
This is confirmed by the inspection of the HM tests as the largest coefficients in the HM regressions are609
recorded for CP-SCA. However, there is no evidence of statistical significance, possibly (presumably)610
because of low test power due to our small sample of out-of-sample observations (59). Nevertheless, the611
directional accuracy tests suggest that currency trading strategies based on the scapegoat model might612
generate economic value higher than RW forecasts.613
Therefore, it is worth examining the results from the Sharpe ratios produced by long-short strategies614
that invest in the currency predicted to appreciate and short the currency predicted to depreciate accord-615
ing to the model. These results are clear-cut. First, several models outperform the RW benchmark, often616
displaying a statistically significantly different (i.e. higher) Sharpe ratio. Second, in general, CP-MS gen-617
erates a higher Sharpe ratio than CP-M, and CP-SCA produces a higher Sharpe ratio than CP-MO.618
Third, on average across all exchange rates (and on average across each subset of industrialized and EM619
countries), CP-SCA produces the highest economic value on the basis of the Sharpe ratio measure –620
being 0.95 on average across all 12 exchange rates, against 0.20 obtained with a random walk.28,29621
Overall, the results in this sub-section confirm the difficulty to outperform the random walk in out-of-622
25The results are qualitatively identical if using one year more or one year less for the out-of-sample period.
26The out-of-sample forecasts are constructed according to a recursive procedure where they are conditional only upon
information up to the date of the forecast and with successive re-estimation as the date on which forecasts are conditioned
moves through the data set. Given the largely illustrative nature of this exercise, the analysis is confined to models
with constant parameters, also because recursive Bayesian estimation of the time-varying parameter models would be
computationally very intensive.
27The table also reports the mean of the excess returns in percent (Mean), and the standard deviation of the returns in
percent (Std. Dev.), from which the Sharpe ratios are calculated.
28Note that in calculating the Sharpe ratios we deliberately do not take into account transactions costs.
29It is also interesting that the simplest macro model, CP −M does quite well in terms of Sharpe ratios while CP −MO
does not, given that typically the literature finds that macro information is less useful than order flow in FX forecasting.
This result is possibly due to the fact that the sample period for the out-of-sample analysis is dominated by the crisis
period, when anecdotally macro variables have performed particularly well.
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sample exchange rate forecasting using conventional statistical metrics such as the RMSFER. However,623
there is evidence that the scapegoat models produce significantly larger economic value than the random624
walk for an investor who follows the forecasts in a conventional long-short currency strategy. The pecking625
order of the models is the same as reported for the in-sample results, indicating that both surveys626
(scapegoats) and order flow have forecasting power, especially when used jointly as in the scapegoat627
model CP-SCA.628
5 Conclusions629
There is ample anecdotal evidence that financial market participants tend to blame individual macro630
fundamentals to rationalize observed exchange rate movements, with such blame often shifting across631
different fundamentals over time. This fact has been conceptualized in the scapegoat theory of exchange632
rates by BvW (2004, 2013). The main insight is that when exchange rates move in response to changes in633
an unobservable fundamental, it is rational for investors to blame factors that they can actually observe,634
and more precisely those macro fundamentals that are out of sync with their long-term equilibrium values635
and move consistently with the observed exchange rate change.636
This paper provides the first empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates, exploiting novel637
data on exchange rate scapegoats from surveys as well as proxies of unobservable fundamentals based638
on FX order flow for a sample of 12 exchange rates over the 2000-2011 period. The empirical analysis639
provides strong support for two key hypotheses derived from the scapegoat theory. First, the scapegoat640
model, especially in its time-varying formulation, does very well in explaining exchange rate movements,641
outperforming benchmark macro and order flow models that do not allow for scapegoat effects. Second, a642
macroeconomic fundamental is picked by market participants as a scapegoat in periods when it strongly643
deviates from its long-term equilibrium and at the same time the unobservable fundamental is large,644
consistent with the theory.645
Of interest is also that, consistent with the predictions of the scapegoat theory, the analysis shows646
that the expectation of the structural parameter tends to the structural parameter as the scapegoat effect647
wears off. However, in terms of out-of-sample exchange rate, the evidence is mixed: while the scapegoat648
models produce out-of-sample forecasts that generate significantly higher economic value than a random649
walk, they cannot outperform a random benchmark on the basis of standard statistical criteria.650
Overall, the first tests of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates provide empirical support to the651
theory, suggesting that expectations of structural parameters, and their interaction with unobservables,652
are important for improving our understanding of exchange rate fluctuations. The results in this paper653
have been obtained using a relatively short sample and assuming that order flow is a suitable proxy for654
unobserved fundamentals. Future research is warranted to examine their validity in longer samples of655
data and with alternative proxies for the unobserved fundamental.656
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Table 1: Constant Parameter Macro Model (CP-M)
Panel A: Industrialized Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity
AUD/USD - −0.22∗∗ 0.27∗∗ −0.31∗∗ - -
- [-0.30;-0.13] [0.14;0.40] [-0.44;-0.18] - -
CAD/USD - −0.30∗∗ 0.17∗∗ - - −0.05∗
- [-0.39;-0.22] [0.09;0.25] - - [-0.14;0.03]
EUR/USD - −0.31∗∗ 0.13∗∗ - −0.16∗∗ -
- [-0.40;-0.22] [0.05;0.21] - [-0.25;-0.08] -
JPY/USD −0.09∗∗ - 0.06∗∗ −0.13∗∗ - -
[-0.16;-0.03] - [0.01;0.12] [-0.22;-0.04] - -
CHF/EUR - −0.05∗ −0.15∗∗ - - 0.09∗∗
- [-0.14;0.04] [-0.23;-0.06] - - [0.00;0.17]
GBP/USD - −0.34∗∗ - −0.07∗∗ −0.30∗∗ -
- [-0.43;-0.24] - [-0.13;-0.02] [-0.40;-0.20] -
Panel B: Emerging Market Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity
CZK/EUR - −0.10∗∗ - −0.16∗∗ - 0.06∗∗
- [-0.17;-0.03] - [-0.25;-0.07] - [0.01;0.10]
MXD/USD −0.05∗∗ 0.01 - - −0.10∗∗ -
[-0.09;-0.01] [-0.08;0.10] - - [-0.17;-0.03] -
PLN/EUR - 0.07∗∗ −0.10∗∗ -0.09 - -
- [0.01;0.13] [-0.19;-0.02] [-0.32;0.15] - -
ZAR/USD −0.18∗∗ - −0.12∗∗ - - 0.18∗∗
[-0.28;-0.08] - [-0.19;-0.04] - - [0.09;0.26]
SGD/USD −0.16∗∗ - −0.11∗∗ 0.16∗∗ - -
[-0.25;-0.08] - [-0.22;-0.00] [0.05;0.28] - -
NZD/USD - −0.26∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.05∗∗ - -
- [-0.36;-0.18] [0.09;0.28] [0.01;0.08] - -
The table presents the estimated loadings of the exchange rate empirical model with constant parameters (CP-M)738
∆st = β1f1,t + β2f2,t + β3f3,t + ut,
where ∆st is the monthly exchange rate return; if st increases the domestic exchange rate (either the USD or the EUR) appreciates.739
The sample period spans from January 2000 to November 2011. The analysis uses three macro factors per country, selected using740
the general-to-specific procedure described in Section 4. Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting741
the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. τs are standardized so that they have unit variance. One-standard deviation742
confidence intervals are reported in brackets. (∗) and (∗∗) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively, do not743
contain 0.
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Table 2: Constant Parameter Scapegoat Model (CP-SCA)
Panel A: Industrialized Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity Order Flow
AUD/USD
β - −0.25∗∗ 0.31∗∗ −0.65∗∗ - - -
- [-0.32;-0.17] [0.17;0.44] [-0.80;-0.50] - - -
γ - −0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ - - −0.49∗∗
- [-0.05;-0.01] [0.02;0.05] [-0.04;-0.01] - - [-0.58;-0.40]
CAD/USD
β - −0.23∗∗ 0.07∗∗ - - −0.13∗∗ -
- [-0.30;-0.17] [0.02;0.13] - - [-0.20;-0.06] -
γ - −0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ - - −0.05∗∗ −0.54∗∗
- [-0.03;-0.00] [0.01;0.03] - - [-0.06;-0.03] [-0.61;-0.47]
EUR/USD
β - −0.22∗∗ 0.04∗∗ - −0.06∗∗ - -
- [-0.30;-0.13] [0.01;0.07] - [-0.10;-0.01] - -
γ - −0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗ - −0.01∗∗ - −0.48∗∗
- [-0.04;-0.01] [0.02;0.04] - [-0.02;-0.00] - [-0.56;-0.40]
JPY/USD
β −0.09∗∗ - 0.07∗∗ −0.21∗∗ - - -
[-0.16;-0.03] - [0.02;0.13] [-0.31;-0.10] - - -
γ −0.01∗∗ - 0.01∗∗ −0.02∗∗ - - −0.56∗∗
[-0.02;-0.00] - [0.00;0.02] [-0.03;-0.01] - - [-0.63;-0.49]
CHF/EUR
β - -0.03 −0.23∗∗ - - 0.12∗∗ -
- [-0.11;0.05] [-0.32;-0.13] - - [0.02;0.22] -
γ - -0.01 −0.01∗∗ - - 0.02∗∗ −0.26∗∗
- [-0.03;0.01] [-0.02;-0.00] - - [0.00;0.04] [-0.35;-0.17]
GBP/USD
β - −0.33∗∗ - −0.12∗∗ −0.13∗∗ - -
- [-0.42;-0.23] - [-0.19;-0.04] [-0.22;-0.04] - -
γ - −0.04∗∗ - −0.03∗∗ −0.06∗∗ - −0.36∗∗
- [-0.06;-0.02] - [-0.04;-0.01] [-0.09;-0.04] - [-0.45;-0.28]
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Panel B: Emerging Market Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity Order Flow
CZK/EUR
β - −0.14∗∗ - −0.07∗∗ - 0.08∗∗ -
- [-0.22;-0.06] - [-0.13;-0.01] - [0.02;0.14] -
γ - −0.05∗∗ - −0.03∗∗ - 0.08∗∗ −0.47∗∗
- [-0.07;-0.03] - [-0.06;-0.01] - [0.06;0.11] [-0.55;-0.40]
MXD/USD
β −0.06∗∗ 0.00 - - −0.13∗∗ - -
[-0.11;-0.01] [-0.09;0.07] - - [-0.22;-0.05] - -
γ −0.02∗∗ 0.01 - - −0.04∗∗ - −0.12∗∗
[-0.04;-0.01] [-0.01;0.03] - - [-0.06;-0.03] - [-0.20;-0.05]
PLN/EUR
β - 0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.27∗∗ - - -
- [0.01;0.13] [-0.15;-0.02] [-0.51;-0.05] - - -
γ - 0.04∗∗ −0.01∗∗ −0.02∗∗ - - −0.48∗∗
- [0.01;0.07] [-0.02;-0.00] [-0.05;-0.00] - - [-0.55;-0.39]
ZAR/USD
β −0.09∗∗ - −0.16∗∗ - - 0.10∗∗ -
[-0.16;-0.02] - [-0.24;-0.08] - - [0.03;0.16] -
γ −0.04∗∗ - −0.03∗∗ - - 0.03∗∗ −0.59∗∗
[-0.06;-0.01] - [-0.04;-0.01] - - [0.02;0.05] [-0.66;-0.52]
SGD/USD
β −0.13∗∗ - −0.11∗∗ 0.17∗∗ - - -
[-0.20;-0.05] - [-0.19;-0.03] [0.07;0.26] - - -
γ −0.02∗∗ - −0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ - - −0.44∗∗
[-0.03;-0.01] - [-0.04;-0.01] [0.01;0.03] - - [-0.52;-0.36]
NZD/USD
β - -0.09 0.26∗∗ 0.05∗∗ - - -
- [-0.22;0.03] [0.17;0.35] [0.01;0.08] - - -
γ - 0.01 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ - - −0.51∗∗
- [-0.01;0.04] [0.01;0.04] [0.00;0.03] - - [-0.58;-0.43]
The table presents the estimates for the coefficients (β, γ and δ) of the constant parameter scapegoat model (CP-SCA):744
∆st = f
′
tβ + (τtft)
′
γ + δxt + ut.
Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. τs745
are standardized so that they have unit variance. The sample period spans from January 2000 to November 2011. One-standard746
deviation confidence intervals are reported in brackets. (∗) and (∗∗) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively,747
do not contain 0.748
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Table 3: Time-varying Parameter Scapegoat Model (TVP-SCA)
Panel A: Industrialized Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity Order Flow
AUD/USD
γ - −0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ - - −0.73∗∗
- [-0.05;-0.01] [0.01;0.07] [-0.05;-0.01] - - [-0.83;-0.62]
CAD/USD
γ - -0.01 0.02∗∗ - - −0.04∗∗ −0.66∗∗
- [-0.04;0.03] [0.01;0.03] - - [-0.06;-0.01] [-0.74;-0.58]
EUR/USD
γ - −0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ - −0.02∗∗ - −0.69∗∗
- [-0.05;-0.01] [0.01;0.04] - [-0.04;-0.01] - [-0.78;-0.60]
JPY/USD
γ −0.01∗∗ - 0.03∗∗ −0.02∗∗ - - −0.59∗∗
[-0.02;-0.00] - [0.01;0.05] [-0.03;-0.00] - - [-0.67;-0.52]
CHF/EUR
γ - 0.00 −0.02∗∗ - - 0.02∗∗ −0.28∗∗
- [-0.03;0.03] [-0.03;-0.00] - - [0.01;0.05] [-0.38;-0.19]
GBP/USD
γ - −0.07∗∗ - −0.03∗∗ −0.10∗∗ - −0.53∗∗
- [-0.11;-0.04] - [-0.05;-0.01] [-0.14;-0.06] - [-0.62;-0.43]
Panel B: Emerging Market Economies
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity Order Flow
CZK/EUR
γ - −0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ −0.03∗∗ - - −0.73∗∗
- [-0.05;-0.01] [0.01;0.07] [-0.05;-0.01] - - [-0.83;-0.62]
MXD/USD
γ - -0.01 0.02∗∗ - - −0.04∗∗ −0.66∗∗
- [-0.04;0.03] [0.01;0.03] - - [-0.06;-0.01] [-0.74;-0.58]
PLN/EUR
γ - −0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ - −0.02∗∗ - −0.69∗∗
- [-0.05;-0.01] [0.01;0.04] - [-0.04;-0.01] - [-0.78;-0.60]
ZAR/USD
γ −0.01∗∗ - 0.03∗∗ −0.02∗∗ - - −0.59∗∗
[-0.02;-0.00] - [0.01;0.05] [-0.03;-0.00] - - [-0.67;-0.52]
SGD/USD
γ - 0.00 −0.02∗∗ - - 0.02∗∗ −0.28∗∗
- [-0.03;0.03] [-0.03;-0.00] - - [0.01;0.05] [-0.38;-0.19]
NZD/USD
γ - −0.07∗∗ - −0.03∗∗ −0.10∗∗ - −0.53∗∗
- [-0.11;-0.04] - [-0.05;-0.01] [-0.14;-0.06] - [-0.62;-0.43]
The table presents the estimates for the time-invariant coefficients (γ and δ) of the time-varying parameter scapegoat model749
(TVP-SCA):750
∆st = f
′
tβt + (τtft)
′
γ + δxt + ut
βt = βt−1 + vt.
Note that all variables, except the surveys, are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by their standard deviation. τs751
are standardized so that they have unit variance. The sample period spans from January 2000 to November 2011. One-standard752
deviation confidence intervals are reported in brackets. (∗) and (∗∗) indicate that the (27-68) and (16-84) intervals, respectively,753
do not contain 0.754
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Table 4: In-sample Model Performance: CP Models
Panel A: Industrialized Economies
R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM
AUD/USD JPY/USD
CP-M 5.79 0.957 0.02 -0.05 58.74 0.18b -0.84 0.995 0.09 0.03 53.15 0.06
CP-MS 11.39 0.931 -0.04 -0.10 58.04 0.18b 0.57 0.999 0.10 0.04 54.55 0.09
CP-MO 22.31 0.865 -0.15 -0.23 74.13 0.48a 27.48 0.834 -0.22 -0.31 72.73 0.46a
CP-SCA 26.71 0.842 -0.21 -0.29 72.03 0.44a 29.28 0.840 -0.21 -0.29 71.33 0.43a
CAD/USD CHF/EUR
CP-M 7.47 0.949 0.00 -0.06 53.85 0.07 0.54 0.984 0.07 0.01 58.04 0.14c
CP-MS 12.16 0.938 -0.02 -0.09 57.34 0.16c 0.89 0.986 0.08 0.01 55.24 0.10
CP-MO 33.09 0.805 -0.29 -0.38 64.34 0.29a 5.53 0.955 0.05 -0.04 63.64 0.27a
CP-SCA 37.47 0.784 -0.35 -0.43 66.43 0.34a 6.21 0.958 0.05 -0.03 64.34 0.29a
EUR/USD GBP/USD
CP-M 6.16 0.956 0.01 -0.05 62.24 0.25a 6.97 0.952 0.01 -0.06 56.64 0.13c
CP-MS 8.30 0.951 0.00 -0.06 61.54 0.24b 11.76 0.931 -0.04 -0.10 58.04 0.17b
CP-MO 26.25 0.840 -0.21 -0.29 73.43 0.47a 16.68 0.901 -0.07 -0.15 62.24 0.25a
CP-SCA 28.61 0.829 -0.24 -0.32 75.52 0.52a 21.66 0.870 -0.14 -0.22 63.64 0.28a
Panel B: Emerging Economies
R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM
CZK/EUR ZAR/USD
CP-M 3.91 0.997 0.10 0.04 55.24 0.12 4.88 0.970 0.04 -0.02 50.35 0.02
CP-MS 9.55 0.965 0.03 -0.03 57.34 0.17b 7.21 0.969 0.04 -0.02 51.75 0.04
CP-MO 21.87 0.889 -0.10 -0.18 65.04 0.30a 32.08 0.816 -0.27 -0.35 75.52 0.51a
CP-SCA 28.82 0.848 -0.19 -0.27 65.73 0.32a 36.65 0.791 -0.33 -0.41 76.22 0.52a
MXD/USD SGD/USD
CP-M -0.86 1.000 0.10 0.04 52.45 0.05 1.42 0.979 0.07 0.00 53.38 0.07
CP-MS 7.92 0.976 0.06 -0.01 51.75 0.08 3.03 0.977 0.06 0.00 50.38 0.01
CP-MO -0.45 0.997 0.13 0.05 56.64 0.13 20.19 0.876 -0.12 -0.20 70.68 0.41a
CP-SCA 8.00 0.970 0.08 0.00 54.55 0.14c 21.66 0.874 -0.12 -0.21 66.92 0.33a
PLN/EUR NZD/USD
CP-M -0.25 1.005 0.11 0.05 45.45 -0.08 7.59 0.985 0.07 0.01 47.55 -0.06
CP-MS 4.99 1.004 0.11 0.05 51.05 0.04 11.49 0.941 -0.02 -0.08 58.74 0.18b
CP-MO 22.85 0.882 -0.11 -0.20 68.53 0.37a 31.85 0.855 -0.18 -0.26 65.73 0.32a
CP-SCA 26.67 0.894 -0.09 -0.17 67.83 0.36a 34.80 0.829 -0.24 -0.32 69.23 0.39a
The table provides several measures of model fit for the constant parameter models: CP-M, CP-MS, CP-MO and CP-SCA. There755
are measures of explained variance, in-sample predictive performance, information criteria and market timing: the adjusted R-756
squared in percent (R2); the root mean squared error (RMSE); the Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike (AIC) information criteria; the757
hit ratios in percent (HR) and the HM test. The HM test is a one-tailed test on the significance of the slope coefficient in the758
following regression:759
I{
∆st>0
} = ϕHM0 + ϕHM1 I{∆˜st>0} + εt,
where ∆st and ∆˜st denote the realized and fitted exchange rate returns, and I is the indicator function equal to unity when760
its argument is true and 0 otherwise. A positive and significant ϕHM1 provides evidence of market timing. Precisely, we report761
under HM ϕ̂1 a, b, and c, denote the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent confidence levels, respectively. Standard error are calculated using762
Newey-West (1987).763
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Table 5: In-sample Model Performance: TVP Models
Panel A: Industrialized Economies
R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM
AUD/USD JPY/USD
TVP-M 13.55 0.907 -0.09 -0.15 58.74 0.20b 4.09 0.945 -0.01 -0.07 64.34 0.29a
TVP-MS 18.64 0.867 -0.18 -0.24 62.94 0.27a 17.83 0.843 -0.24 -0.30 71.33 0.43a
TVP-MO 33.12 0.766 -0.40 -0.48 74.83 0.49a 35.78 0.757 -0.42 -0.50 81.12 0.63a
TVP-SCA 47.55 0.644 -0.74 -0.83 79.72 0.59a 38.10 0.743 -0.46 -0.54 79.72 0.60a
CAD/USD CHF/EUR
TVP-M 7.49 0.925 -0.05 -0.11 60.14 0.20a 1.14 0.965 0.03 -0.03 62.24 0.22a
TVP-MS 11.68 0.910 -0.09 -0.15 59.44 0.20a 8.47 0.967 0.04 -0.03 62.94 0.25a
TVP-MO 41.80 0.715 -0.53 -0.62 72.73 0.47a 6.72 0.921 -0.02 -0.11 69.93 0.40a
TVP-SCA 48.80 0.663 -0.68 -0.77 77.62 0.56a 9.29 0.908 -0.05 -0.14 71.33 0.42a
EUR/USD GBP/USD
TVP-M 9.32 0.932 -0.04 -0.10 63.64 0.29a 9.36 0.894 -0.12 -0.18 66.43 0.33a
TVP-MS 13.66 0.930 -0.04 -0.10 66.43 0.33a 20.28 0.852 -0.22 -0.28 67.83 0.36a
TVP-MO 41.23 0.726 -0.50 -0.58 81.12 0.62a 27.59 0.776 -0.37 -0.45 67.83 0.36a
TVP-SCA 43.04 0.701 -0.57 -0.65 80.42 0.61a 41.98 0.673 -0.65 -0.74 72.03 0.44a
Panel B: Emerging Economies
R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM R2(%) RMSE BIC AIC HR(%) HM
CZK/EUR ZAR/USD
TVP-M 5.00 0.921 -0.06 -0.12 62.24 0.25a 4.26 0.950 0.00 -0.06 53.85 0.08
TVP-MS 10.84 0.904 -0.10 -0.16 60.14 0.21a 6.39 0.931 -0.04 -0.10 53.85 0.08
TVP-MO 24.82 0.817 -0.26 -0.35 65.04 0.30a 34.21 0.777 -0.36 -0.45 77.62 0.55a
TVP-SCA 31.20 0.795 -0.32 -0.40 67.13 0.34a 39.15 0.743 -0.46 -0.54 75.52 0.51a
MXD/USD SGD/USD
TVP-M 0.86 0.949 0.00 -0.06 62.94 0.32a 3.69 0.931 -0.03 -0.10 58.65 0.17b
TVP-MS 15.41 0.863 -0.19 -0.25 65.73 0.30a 12.57 0.888 -0.13 -0.19 63.16 0.26a
TVP-MO 1.95 0.935 0.00 -0.08 65.73 0.33a 28.51 0.781 -0.35 -0.43 72.93 0.46a
TVP-SCA 14.12 0.851 -0.18 -0.27 69.23 0.38a 35.82 0.720 -0.51 -0.60 69.92 0.40a
PLN/EUR NZD/USD
TVP-M 5.70 0.912 -0.08 -0.14 65.73 0.32a 19.18 0.860 -0.20 -0.26 66.43 0.32a
TVP-MS 12.48 0.853 -0.21 -0.28 67.13 0.35a 30.74 0.774 -0.41 -0.47 75.52 0.51a
TVP-MO 29.23 0.789 -0.34 -0.42 78.32 0.57a 41.37 0.742 -0.46 -0.54 74.83 0.49a
TVP-SCA 37.72 0.712 -0.54 -0.62 82.52 0.65a 42.09 0.734 -0.48 -0.56 76.92 0.54a
The table provides several measures of model fit for the time-varying parameter models: TVP-M, TVP-MS, TVP-MO and TVP-764
SCA. There are measures of explained variance, in-sample predictive performance, information criteria and market timing: the765
adjusted R-squared in percent (R2); the root mean squared error (RMSE); the Bayesian (BIC) and Akaike (AIC) information766
criteria; the hit ratios in percent (HR) and the HM test. The HM test is a one-tailed test on the significance of the slope coefficient767
in the following regression:768
I{
∆st>0
} = ϕHM0 + ϕHM1 I{∆˜st>0} + εt,
where ∆st and ∆˜st denote the realized and fitted exchange rate returns, and I is the indicator function equal to unity when769
its argument is true and 0 otherwise. A positive and significant ϕHM1 provides evidence of market timing. Precisely, we report770
under HM ϕ̂1 a, b, and c, denote the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent confidence levels, respectively. Standard error are calculated using771
Newey-West (1987).772
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Table 6: Exchange Rates, Order Flow and Macro Factors
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST
q 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
α0 0.31 -0.39 -0.36 0.17 0.13 0.09 0.10 -0.04 -0.19
t-stat [0.90] [-2.29] [-3.42] [0.75] [0.89] [0.90] [0.58] [-0.43] [-2.55]
α1 -0.28 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00
t-stat [-2.41] [-1.02] [-0.58] [0.28] [0.07] [-0.44] [0.70] [0.14] [0.13]
R2N (%) 26 11 10 -2 -1 0 -1 3 3
N 18 50 99 31 83 154 59 139 227
∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity
q 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
α0 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.53 -0.32 -0.19
t-stat [-0.32] [0.40] [0.36] [0.27] [0.18] [0.38] [-1.97] [-2.06] [-1.76]
α1 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 -0.05 0.01
t-stat [-2.01] [-2.89] [-2.84] [-1.67] [-2.10] [-2.41] [-0.93] [-0.82] [0.19]
R2N (%) 9 9 5 11 6 5 13 4 2
N 33 79 137 7 9 14 27 62 100
The table presents the regression of the exchange rate return on the order flow times the macro factor:773
∆st = α0 + α1 (−xt × fn,t) I{
f
q
n,t,x
q
t
} + ut.
The order flow is taken with the minus sign so that the expected sign should be the one expected from regressing the exchange774
rate return on the fundamental. The order flow and the fundamental are selected for different quantiles ranging from 20 to 40775
percent. Precisely, each variable is sorted in absolute value and we take the largest 20, 30 and 40 percent of the observations, and776
the observation is selected only if in that period both the fundamental and order flow are included in their respective quantiles. N777
denotes the number of times the fundamental times order flow is selected for each quantile. Thus, I{
f
q
n,t,x
q
t
} takes the value of 1778
if at time t both fn,t and xt are in the top q percent of observations. This means that both the fundamental and order flow have779
experienced a sufficiently large shock. Note that the macro fundamentals are selected only if the scapegoat effect γ̂n is significant780
in Table 3. R2N is the adjusted R
2s computed over the N observations. The regression is estimated using robust estimation; by781
default, the Matlab algorithm uses iteratively re-weighted least squares with a bisquare weighting function.782
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Table 7: Surveys, Order Flow and Macro Factors
∆Growth ∆Inflation ∆Rate ST
q 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
ζ0 -0.28 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.11
t-stat [-1.37] [0.31] [0.77] [1.69] [0.24] [0.28] [0.13] [0.20] [1.30]
ζ1 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.47 0.59 0.59 0.26 0.25 0.26
t-stat [3.70] [3.50] [3.30] [2.45] [3.60] [4.05] [4.23] [4.46] [5.43]
R2NI (%) 48 31 15 22 12 9 55 35 36
R2NII (%) 49 46 35 48 51 41 57 40 42
NI 18 50 99 44 110 203 59 139 227
NII 9 20 37 4 10 19 46 112 181
∆Rate LT CA ∆Equity
20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40% 20% 30% 40%
ζ0 0.35 0.16 0.11 -0.82 -0.73 -0.58 -0.06 -0.04 0.02
t-stat [2.10] [1.26] [1.19] [-5.07] [-7.54] [-5.84] [-0.75] [-0.53] [0.30]
ζ1 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.22 0.28 0.32
t-stat [0.51] [0.78] [1.59] [6.83] [7.49] [5.66] [2.87] [3.19] [4.08]
R2NI (%) 15 4 4 50 53 34 21 16 13
R2NII (%) 24 11 17 68 55 49 79 69 69
NI 39 89 152 21 45 79 27 62 100
NII 9 24 37 7 9 14 3 12 24
The table displays the results for the six panel regressions of the survey (τn,t) on the absolute value of the correspondent macro783
factor (fn,t) times the order flow (xt) times the indicator functions
(
I{τn,t>τj,t}
)
and
(
I{
f
q
n,t,x
q
t
}). The latter takes the value784
of 1 if the survey on the macro factor n exceeds the values of the other two macro factors j 6= n at each time t. For a generic785
survey τn,t we estimate:786
τn,t = ζ0 + ζ1
∣∣xt × fn,t∣∣ I{fqn,t,xqt}I{τn,t>τj,t} + εt,
where n is an index of macro variable and t is an index of time. For each of the six regressions, a country macro variable is included787
or not according to whether it was previously selected in Table 3 using our selection procedure. For example, for n = ∆Growth788
only JPY, MXD, ZAR and SGD are used. Similarly to Table 6, NI denotes the number of times the fundamental times order789
flow is selected for each quantile. In addition, within these NI observations, NII denotes the number of times the fundamental790
n exceeds the values of the other two macro factors j 6= n. Then, R2NI and R
2
NII
are the adjusted R2s computed over the NI791
and NII observations, respectively. The regression is estimated using robust estimation; by default, the Matlab algorithm uses792
iteratively re-weighted least squares with a bisquare weighting function.793
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Table 8: Learning in the long run
∆Growth ∆Inflation
b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%) b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%)
-0.05 −0.236a −0.282a 22.64 0.225a −0.376a −0.151a 58.24
[0.056] [0.057] [0.098] [0.017] [0.022] [0.037]
∆Rate ST ∆Rate LT
b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%) b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%)
0.097a −0.163a −0.066a 58.15 0.149a −0.335a −0.187a 50.64
[0.007] [0.010] [0.016] [0.020] [0.026] [0.042]
CA ∆Equity
b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%) b1 b2 b1 + b2 R2(%)
0.067c −0.257a −0.191a 54.19 0.134c −0.432a −0.298b 26.83
[0.040] [0.031] [0.063] [0.071] [0.084] [0.145]
The table presents the results of the six panel regressions of the change in the scapegoat on a constant, the lagged value of the794
scapegoat and the lagged value of the respective structural parameter. The following regression is estimated:795
∆Êtβn,t = b0 + b1( ̂Et−1βn,t−1 − β̂n,t−1) + b2( ̂Et−1βn,t−1 − β̂n,t−1)I{∆τn,t<0} + εn,t.
where n is an index of the macro variable (e.g. growth). The dependent variable and the regressors are denoted with an (̂·)796
indicating the fact that they are the estimates of model TVP-SCA. More specifically, β̂n,t−1 is the estimated time-varying structural797
parameter, and Êtβn,t = γ̂nτn,t, where γ̂n is the estimated scapegoat parameter, as presented in Table 3, and τn,t is the survey.798
I{∆τn,t<0} is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 for negative changes in the survey (∆τn,t < 0), and 0 otherwise.799
Note that the macro fundamentals are selected only if the scapegoat effect γ̂n is significant in Table 3. Moreover, β̂n,t−1 is selected800
only if in that month the survey is available. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are reported in parenthesis. a, b, and c, denote801
the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent confidence levels, respectively.802
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Table 9: Out-of-sample Model Performance by Groups
Panel A: All Currencies
RW CP-M CP-MS CP-MO CP-SCA
RMSFER 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.03 1.06
HR(%) - 52.92 54.39 52.19 54.82
HM - 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.07
Mean 1.48 5.63 6.96 6.63 7.92
Std. Dev. 10.38 9.16 8.32 8.88 8.36
Sharpe Ratio 0.20 0.63 0.86 0.74 0.95
Panel B: Industrialized Economies
RW CP-M CP-MS CP-MO CP-SCA
RMSFER 1.00 1.02 1.08 1.03 1.09
HR(%) - 52.34 52.92 51.75 54.09
HM - -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.06
Mean 1.26 6.51 7.50 7.29 8.56
Std. Dev. 8.88 8.72 7.76 9.18 8.30
Sharpe Ratio 0.26 0.69 0.96 0.72 0.98
Panel C: Emerging Economies
RW CP-M CP-MS CP-MO CP-SCA
RMSFER - 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03
HR(%) - 53.51 55.85 52.63 55.56
HM - 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.09
Mean 1.71 4.75 6.43 5.96 7.27
Std. Dev. 11.87 9.61 8.88 8.58 8.42
Sharpe Ratio 0.13 0.56 0.76 0.75 0.92
The table presents the averages by groups of the out-of-sample model performance statistics presented in Table VIII in the Internet803
Appendix. Specifically, this table reports: the ratio of the root mean squared forecast error of the indicated model over the that804
of the random walk (RMSFER); the hit ratio (HR); the Henriksson-Merton test (HM); the mean of the excess returns in percent805
(Mean), the standard deviation of the returns in percent (Std. Dev.) and the Sharpe Ratios. The model is estimated recursively806
for each currency the sample starts in January 2000 and out-of-sample forecasts are evaluated over the period from January 2007807
to November 2011.808
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Figure 1: Selected scapegoat variables. The figures show the exchange rate consensus surveys selected by our
methodology for four currencies: Canadian dollar, euro, Czech koruna and South African rand. The sample spans the
period from January 2000 to November 2011.
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